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Abstract: In his infl uential work on Kant and history, Yirmiyahu Yovel 
identifi es a problem which he terms ‘the historical antinomy.’  The problem 
states that no possible mediation can take place between the atemporal 
realm of pure reason and the empirical realm of human history.  In this 
paper, I aim to bridge this gap based on a two-aspect reading of the faculty 
of reason, and then proceed to show reason’s ability to apply transcendental 
ideas on empirical history for the sake of grasping a rational idea of history 
in a single, mediated process.
I. Yovel’s Historical Antinomy
It is a patent understatement to say that reason is for Immanuel Kant 
the most important characteristic of the human being, and serves as 
the fundamental faculty in the promotion of historical progress.  Some 
commentators, however, fi nd that Kant’s description of reason (Vernunft) 
in history (Geschichte) is not without inherent complications.  One 
such problem was identifi ed in a paper delivered in 1978 by Yirmiyahu 
Yovel, wherein he expressed concerns over a pair of seemingly untenable 
problems, namely, what he coined as the “historical antinomy” and the 
“problem of historical schematism” (Yovel, 1978, p. 129).1  The ‘historical 
antinomy’ considers reason in relation to Kant’s theory of time, and Yovel 
argues that it reveals a major diffi culty in Kant’s philosophy of history:
For reason to be a historical principle it must be embodied 
in actual time. Yet time, according to Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetics, is merely a “form of intuition” that cannot apply to 
reason at all, only to empirical data categorized by the forms of 
the understanding. (1978, p. 129)
Subsequently, Yovel asserts that this constitutive contradiction, i.e., 
reason portrayed as simultaneously temporal and atemporal, is not only 
confl icting but also equally necessary to Kant’s philosophy of history, 
hence the antinomy.2
The ‘problem of historical schematism’ displays a similar 
incompatibility, but instead of examining the relation of reason to its 




by arguing that Kant cannot give a comprehensive account of reason in 
history:
How can a bridge be built between the history of reason and 
empirical history? I think that Kant does not and cannot have 
a suffi cient answer. Reason is to grow, mature, and affect the 
world in and through empirical history, which goes on in time 
and is bound by natural laws. How can the correspondence 
between real states in experience and the stages in the evolution 
of reason be accounted for? (Yovel, 1980, p. 21)
Because Yovel thinks that no possible mediation can take place between 
the atemporal realm of reason and the empirical realm of history, the laws 
specifi c to those contrasting realms “cannot be united in a single process” 
(1980, p. 21).  Consequently, the ‘problem of ‘historical schematism’ 
compliments the ‘historical antinomy’ insofar as it calls attention to a lack 
of unity in Kant’s account of how reason can be mediated by empirical 
history, and Yovel ultimately collapses both problems by calling them the 
“historical antinomy” (Yovel, 1980, p. 272).
The diffi culties that arise from the ‘historical antinomy’ disclose 
two interesting and indispensable aspects of reason, namely, as mainly 
described in Kant’s systematic philosophy, (i) reason as formally self-
standing and not given to temporal development, and, as described in 
Kant’s historical writings, (ii) reason as temporally progressive, following 
its own rational blueprint, moving toward greater development and facility, 
and increasing its infl uence in a world that may be rationally hoped (e.g., 
inter alia, a world of expanding enlightenment, moral community, and 
perpetual peace).3  The picture which emerges from Yovel’s examination 
of this problem is one of deep dissatisfaction, namely, that Kant’s formal 
description of reason seems embarrassingly unsuited with his idea of its 
evolving, historical development.
 In this paper, I want to examine whether this problem is as 
untenable as Yovel believes.  Specifi cally, I aim to address perhaps the 
most pertinent of Yovel’s questions, viz.: How can a bridge be built 
between rational history and empirical history?  Yovel’s own attempt to 
address this problem locates how the concept of refl ective judgment in 
the third Critique is Kant’s main innovation to answering the problem 
of reason as teleologically presented (Yovel, 1980, p. 159).4  However, 
while Yovel is right to incorporate the role of refl ective judgment toward 
an explication of the development of reason in history, he ultimately 
concludes that systematic diffi culties remain because “Kant [cannot] 
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admit of an affi nity between pure reason and its opposite, empirical 
reality” (Yovel, 1980, pp. 271-72).  
It is important to note that Yovel does not ask for proof of a 
correspondence between the history of reason and empirical history, but 
only for an answer that does not violate or do damage to Kantian tenets 
while also showing how the two modes are compatible and “ultimately 
coherent” (Yovel, 1980, p. 22).  In an attempt to respond to this 
diffi culty, this essay aims to explore whether there might be a different 
way to frame Yovel’s problem in order to fi nd some kind of unifi cation 
between reason and history.  Consequently, it argues that there is a way 
to skirt the ‘schematism’ by showing how Kant’s systematic philosophy 
can provide a desired rapprochement, with the result that some of the 
features which Yovel takes as hopeless and impossible might actually 
fi nd plausible resolution.
II. An Attempt at Skirting the Schematism
In his magisterial Kant and the Philosophy of History, Yovel states that 
he put aside Kant’s “peripheral” or historical essays (Yovel, 1980, p. 
127), instead turning his reconstructive efforts toward Kant’s systematic 
writings.5  In contradistinction to Yovel’s approach, my paper takes its 
central point of departure from Kant’s 1784 Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Intent; specifi cally, its Second Thesis:
Reason in a creature is a faculty to extend the rules and 
objectives of the use of all of its powers far beyond its natural 
instinct, and reason knows no limits in the scope of its projects. 
However, reason itself does not operate on instinct, but requires 
trial, practice, and instruction in order to gradually progress 
from one stage of insight to another. (Kant, 2006, p. 5)
 
What I fi nd so important about this sentence is Kant’s statement that 
“reason in a creature is a faculty” (Die Vernunft in einem Geschöpfe ist 
ein Vermögen),6 which will be crucial to my efforts to bridge the gap of 
Yovel’s historical antinomy.  Toward this goal, I will turn to Kant’s essential 
formulation of reason as a faculty or capacity7 in its regulative use,8 i.e., 
as a fundamental ability to do something or perform some function, 
and then proceed to show the unique function of the “transcendental 
ideas” of reason in its unifying sense.Viewed in this light, reason can 
be understood as one thing with two, non-contradictory aspects: reason 
presented as a constitutive, a priori ground; as well as reason functioning 




antinomy,’ Yovel seems to confl ate these two aspects; namely, he seems 
to miss the distinction between reason as the faculty of principles (i.e., as 
a capability), which is possessed by all rational human beings, and reason 
as the faculty of principles (i.e., as knowledge a priori).9  The difference 
being that the former is a capability which is possessed and requires 
growth in temporality, while the conceptual fund of principles in the latter 
is, indeed, atemporally set.
The faculty of reason can therefore be understood as an inherent 
ability to perform some action by using very specifi c principles, an ability 
that not only improves in historical time, as related in the historical essays, 
but also serves for the comprehension, “something to which reason leads 
through its inferences” (Kant, 1998, A311/BB367).  In this capacity, 
reason is a faculty of inferences which directs and provides guidelines or 
maxims for the use of knowledge.  However, it is also important to note 
that this normatively guided action can sometimes fail in its performance, 
requiring reason to correct its own errancy.  
Consequently, we can detect a consistent thread that is woven through 
Kant’s critical works and historical essays that portrays reason as a readily 
available faculty, one that is restless, in need of instruction to perfect 
its powers, as well as being confronted with its own challenges, which 
it attempts to overcome toward its future fulfi lment in speciel mankind. 
While Kant argues that all of a creature’s natural predispositions (Anlagen) 
are indeed destined to develop in conformity with its end (the fi rst Thesis 
in ‘Idea’), it is actually the faculty of reason that requires sustained 
practice and self-instruction to progresses toward its destinal perfection 
(the second Thesis in ‘Idea’).  Consequently, a plausible response to the 
problem of the historical antinomy is to note that reason as a faculty has 
two unequivocal aspects: reason is a capacity that is possessed by rational 
beings (e.g., a normal human infant has the faculty of reason, and though 
not yet rational, still possesses this innate capacity), and reason is also a 
capability whose use can be cultivated and improved in temporality (e.g., 
an adult whose faculty of reason has been developed and promoted by 
education [Bildung], which improves the faculty’s own ability to form 
better judgments).  It is this dual aspect of the faculty of reason, which I 
shall argue can serve to bridge the historical antinomy.
III. The Faculty of Reason
The association of reason with being a capacity is raised by Kant in 
his theoretical, moral, and historical writings; indeed, perhaps no more 
forcefully than in the 1785 Groundwork’s two-worlds theory, wherein 
he makes the argument that the moral law is made possible by virtue of 
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human beings having a rational faculty to cognize themselves as members 
of the intelligible world (Kant, 1997b, p. 58), which is not only a sine qua 
non foundation of all rational actions, but also takes into account reason 
as a capacity that is shared with all other all rational agents (Kant, 1997b, 
p. 57).
Moreover, the thesis that reason is a capacity which is possessed 
by human beings is affi rmed by Kant in the Second Introduction of his 
Critique.  Kant inaugurates his critical project by writing that, “reason is 
the faculty that provides the principles of cognition a priori” (Kant, 1998, 
A11/B24), which is rearticulated in the Transcendental Dialectic more 
succinctly as “the faculty of principles” (Kant, 1988, A299/B356).  As 
faculty qua other human faculties, e.g., cognition, judgment, perception, 
etc., Kant argues that reason not only infl uences other faculties, but is also 
capable of realizing its own interests, which is also expressed in the second 
Critique: “Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of 
all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own” (Kant, 1997a, p. 
100).
Refl ecting on his characterization of the faculty of reason in the fi rst 
and second Critiques, in the Preface to his third Critique, Kant begins to 
describing reason not only as a faculty containing principles, but also as 
an active ability (Vermögen) to cognize from a priori principles (Kant, 
2000, p. 55), and we see him reiterating the very same notion in the 1798 
Anthropology, wherein he states, possibly itself bridging the gap between 
the systematic and historical works, that the human being is endowed with 
a special “capacity of reason…whereby he fi rst preserves himself and his 
species; second, trains, instructs, and educates his species for domestic 
society; third, governs it as a systematic whole (arranged according to 
principles of reason) appropriate for society” (Kant, 2006, p. 226).  
Consequently, we observe how Kant consistently describes reason, 
whether theoretical or practical, as a productive capacity or “practical 
faculty” (praktisches Vermögen).  Hence, while we note that the faculty of 
reason is constituted a priori, it also requires interaction with the empirical 
world, and Kant argues that through this repeated interaction, the faculty 
of reason becomes “more developed” through “progressive cultivation” 
(Kant, 2000, p. 322).
The idea here is that the faculty of reason does not develop in a 
vacuum.  Far from being perfect, reason also has weaknesses, and in 
the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant writes that reason cannot completely 
free itself from mistaken entanglements because there will always exist a 
possibility for reason to be deceived (Kant, 1998, A298/B354-5).  Here 




can never be assured of its correctness, but must always be open to 
submitting itself to self-correction.  As we have seen, Kant’s wide-ranging 
catalogue of the faculty of reason describes it as an innately possessed 
capacity, which, as ability, is given to improvement, as would exhibit any 
other type of capacity.
Reason as a capacity thus displays a self-determining, creative facility, 
one that is seemingly without limits, and Kant argues that reason is 
purposive insofar as the products of reason are aimed toward its own ends.
IV. Bridging the Historical Antinomy
We have seen how in Kant’s theoretical, moral, teleological, anthropological, 
and historical writings, the faculty of reason is characterized as a useful 
capacity.  In this sense, Kant argues that the faculty of reason can also be 
useful in furnishing standards and goals by seeking out the highest ground 
of unconditional unity.  In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant states that 
the transcendental ideas perform this function (Kant, 1998, A299/B355-6), 
and my own reading of these ideas is in accord with Sebastian Gardner’s 
view that as an active capacity, “Reason thus transforms itself from a purely 
formal, merely logical faculty, into a ‘transcendental’ faculty intended for 
a ‘real use’” (Gardner, 1999, p. 217).
Kant argues that in this capacity, the transcendental ideas of reason 
strive to unify and subsume all particular experiences under increasingly 
higher principles of knowledge (Kant, 1998, A321/B378).  Subsequently, 
the transcendental ideas serve as a kind of guide to the unconditioned, 
and can be used to grasp normative standards.  If we apply this regulative 
use of reason to history, we might say that when reason at fi rst considers 
empirical instances of history it employs the transcendental ideas to 
formulate a totality.  Here we note that in addition to the three special 
transcendental ideas (the subject, the world, and God), Kant identifi es 
other possible ideas of reason that can serve as “ground” or standards.
Is empirical history included in the employment of these ideas?  It 
is, for example, when Kant turns to consider the transcendental ideas in 
relation to historical instruments of political governance:
A constitution providing for the greatest human freedom 
according to laws that permit the freedom of each to exist 
together with that of others (not one providing for the greatest 
happiness, since that would follow of itself) is at least a 
necessary idea, which one must make the ground not merely of 
the primary plan of a state’s constitution but of all the laws too; 
and in it we must initially abstract from the present obstacles, 
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which may perhaps arise not so much from what is unavoidable 
in human nature as rather from neglect of the true ideas in the 
giving of laws. (Kant, 1998, A316/B373)
As this passage illustrates, when reason employs the transcendental ideas to 
history, the seeming incompatibility between empirical and rational history 
which was identifi ed by Yovel appears to be mediated in a single process. 
Consequently, with an understanding of the dynamic interplay between 
the faculty of reason and history (i.e., its regulative use, the employment 
of transcendental ideas, and historical content), we can continue to build 
a bridge to span the divide Yovel discerns between rational and empirical 
history.
We begin by noting that the when the faculty of reason turns its power 
to consider history it attempts to piece together its empirical components 
under regulating principles that can formulate a rational conception of the 
whole.  If we now overlay this rational activity over empirical activity in 
history, we might say that the faculty of reason attempts to seek a mode of 
totality in the seeming interplay of unrelated events, and even though these 
are ideas, they have a practical, poietic power:
In it practical reason even has the causality actually to bring 
forth what its concept contains; and hence of such wisdom we 
cannot likewise say disparagingly: It is only an idea; rather 
just because it is the idea of a necessary unity of all possible 
ends, it must serve as a rule, the original and at least limiting 
condition, for everything practical. Although we have to say 
of the transcendental concepts of reason: They are only ideas, 
we will by no means regard them as superfl uous and nugatory. 
(Kant, 1998, A328/B385)
These ideas are regulative insofar as they represent states of affairs that do 
not exist, but provide standards that ought to exist.  They serve as models 
of rational hope which we ought to work to achieve, and in this activity 
reason and empirical history do seem to be mediated in a single process.
V. Closing Remarks
I began this paper by developing Yovel’s concerns over the historical 
antinomy, and proceeded to consider the question of how a bridge could 
be built between the reason and empirical history.  In formulating the 
problem, Yovel asked only for a reconciliation that does not violate Kant’s 




totality (Yovel, 1980, p. 286).  With regard to this problem, I fi rst posited 
a response based on a two-aspect reading of faculty of reason, and then 
moved to show the faculty of reason’s ability to apply transcendental ideas 
to empirical history for the sake of grasping a rational and regulative idea 
of history as a totality. Considered together, I should hope they represent a 
plausible response to how Kant’s philosophy is able to mediate reason and 
history in a single process.10
Notes
1 The problem of the ‘historical antinomy’ receives expanded treatment in 
Yovel (1980).
2 In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that time (and space) is 
an irremovable form of intuition, which is a priori and makes the “actuality of 
appearances possible” (Kant, 1998, A31/B46).  Therefore, because reason is a 
transcendental faculty, if it were historicized, and thus unavoidably integrated 
within time, it would have to take on the character of an appearance, which is 
self-contradictory.
3 A similar problem identifying an untenable dualism within Kant’s 
philosophy is raised by Michael Despland (1973, pp. 66-7) with regard to Kantian 
morality as both timeless and embedded in the historical process, which is quickly 
introduced and then passed over just as quickly.
4 For example, by refl ecting on history in an analogical or metaphorical 
sense, i.e., as if it is purposive, without ascribing any purpose to history itself.
5 Robert B. Louden (2000, p. 6) states that Kant scholars are generally 
preoccupied with the three Critiques, with the result of neglecting his other 
writings; especially, the in the “fi eld of impure ethics,” which is the name Louden 
gives to those areas of Kant’s writings which are not concerned exclusively with 
aprioristic cognition.  Moreover, in contrast to Yovel, Allen Wood (1999, p. 208) 
argues that “Kant’s philosophy of history is indispensable for an understanding 
of his ethical thought.”  As does also Pauline Kleingeld (2001, p. 204), “Kant’s 
philosophy of history… fulfi lls a function in both his theoretical and his practical 
philosophy.”
6 I will use the terms ‘faculty’ and ‘capacity’ interchangeably; basically, 
as an ability.  The German Vermögen treats these terms synonymously.  For an 
instructive treatment of the term ‘faculty’ and its connotations within Kant’s 
Critique, see Wood (2008, pp. 114-16).
7 The German word for ‘capacity’ and ‘faculty’ is also rendered as Anlage 
(‘predisposition’) and Fähigkeit, but as I will soon show, it is only as Vermögen, 
which connotes the power or capability to do something, that Kant employs when 
describing the faculty/capacity/ability of reason.
8 Regulative principles not only set a goal for us, they also include 
procedures that we can use to reach this goal.
9 Gilles Deleuze (1999, pp. 1-10) also draws a distinction between reason 
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as a faculty in relation to its interests, and as a faculty “capable of realizing [its] 
interests.”
10 I should very much like to thank Professor McQuillan for his generous 
comments to my original submission, which prompted me to consider Yovel’s 
claims and Kant’s critical explications of reason in instructive ways.
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